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Torres v. State
No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(order granting stay of execution and remanding
case for evidentiary hearing)
I. Facts
In 1996 an Oklahoma jury tried and convicted Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican
national, of one count of burglary and two counts of first-degree murder.' The
Oklahoma County District Court subsequently affirmed the jury's conviction and
sentence of death.' A state court of criminal appeals then affirmed both the
conviction and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.3
In 1998 the state court of criminal appeals denied petitioner's first applica-
tion for postconviction relief.4 A year later a federal district court rejected
Torres's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.' Thereafter, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
petitioner's second application for postconviction relief, and his execution was
set for May 18, 2004.6 However, less than three weeks before the scheduled
execution, defense counsel filed a third application for postconviction relief
1. Tortes v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) [hereinafter Torres 11. Two
perpetrators, one wearing a white and the other a black t-shirt, shot and killed Francisco Morales
and Maria Yanez in their Oklahoma City house. Id at 8. Responding to a 911 call, police arrested
Torres and George Ochoa walking a short distance from the crime scene. Id Ochoa wore a black
t-shirt, and Torres wore a white t-shirt with blood on it. Id A witness identified both Torres and
Ochoa as the two men that she saw removing a gun from the trunk of a car shortly before the
homicide. Id
2. Id at 7-8.
3. Id at 26; Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, at I (Okla. Crim. App. May 13,2004) (order
granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing) [hereinafter Torrs 111].
4. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at I (citing Tortes v. State, No. PCD-1998-213 (Okla. Crim.
App. Aug. 4, 1998) (order not selected for publication)).
5. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 563 (2003) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting in the Court's
denial of certiorari). Torres argued that the State violated his rights secured by the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations ('Vienna Convention") and failed to contact the Mexican consular
following his arrest. Id; see Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1148 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying
Tortes the opportunity to expand his supplemental request for a certificate of appealability); see also
Meghan H. Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 609 (2004) (analyzing Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct.
562 (2003) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari)).
6. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 1.
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alleging that the violations of Torres's rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations ('Vienna Convention") precluded his execution.7
II. Holding
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Torres's execution
indefinitely, granted Torres's request for an evidentiary hearing, and remanded
the case to the district court of Oklahoma County.' The trial court was to decide
the following: "(a) whether Tortes was prejudiced by the State's violation of his
Vienna Convention rights in failing to inform Tortes, after he was detained, that
he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate; and (b) ineffective assistance
of counsel."9 Lastly, the appellate court set deadlines for the hearing and subse-
quent filings from both parties.'0
Judge Chapel filed a concurring opinion tothe stay order." Judge Chapel
specifically addressed state courts' obligations regarding the Vienna Convention.1
2
He concluded that the United States, as a signatory to the multinational treaty
and the Optional Protocol, is bound by the resolutions of the International Court
of Justice ("I.C.J.")."3
IlL. Ana~yls
In March of 2004 the I.C.J. decided Case ConcerningAvena and OtherMexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States) ("Avend'.' 4 Tortes was among the 52
7. Id
8. Id at 2.
9. Id
10. Id
11. Torres Iff, No. PCD-04-442, at 1 (Chapel, J., concurring).
12. Id at 3-7 (ChapelJ., concurring); see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,
1963, art. 36, 1,21 U.S.T. 77,100-01,596 U.N.T.S. 261,293, 294 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]
(requiring notification of consular rights and an opportunity for consular consultation before
detaining authorities take any action that may infringe upon the rights of a foreign national).
13. Torres II, No. PCD-04-442,at 2 (ChapelJ., concurring). Because the Vienna Convention
did not include an enforcement mechanism, the United States helped draft and then accepted the
Optional Protocol to provide that mechanism. Id Judge Lumpkin, dissenting, found that the I.C.J.
decision was not binding upon the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Torres I, No. PCD-04-
442, at 2 (Lumpkin,J., dissenting). Furthermore, the judge stated that Torres's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was barred by res judicata. Id at 1.
14. TomsIII, No. PCD-04-442,at 1 (ChapelJ., concurring); see Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), No. 128, 153(4-11) (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter
Avena] (holding that the United States failed in securing Vienna Convention rights to the Mexican
nationals). Acting as the judicial arm of the United Nations, the I.C.J. made the following judg-
ments in Avena (1) the United States breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention by not
notifying 49 Mexican detainees of their Article 36 rights; (2) the United States breached Article 36
of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the Mexican consular post of the detention of 51
Mexican nationals; (3) the United States breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention by
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Mexican citizens who brought suit in Avena.'5 The I.C.J. found that the United
States had violated Torres's rights guaranteed by the Vienna Convention. 6 By
a vote of fourteen to one, the I.C.J. called upon the United States to "provide, by
means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration" for the Mexican nation-
als' convictions and sentences. 7 In his concurrence to Tores III, Judge Chapel
characterized the duty of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as being to
"determine how to apply that ruling."'"
A. The Suprema!y Clause and the Vienna Convention
Judge Chapel pointed out that the United States is party to the Vienna
Convention and the Optional Protocol and thereby bound to the provisions of
the international treaty. 9 Citing Nielsen v. Johnson,-°Judge Chapel enunciated the
principle of constitutional law that the federal government's treaty-making
authority supercedes the power of the states.2' Judge Chapel further noted that
a "failure of United States courts to abide by the Vienna Convention may have
significant adverse consequences for United States citizens abroad. ' ' 2 Reciproc-
ity is essential to the stability of international law, and, in the opinion of Judge
Chapel, ignoring the international rights of foreign nationals may inspire like
action towards American citizens in foreign countries.23
Because the Constitution vests the treaty-making power in the President and
the Senate, the judiciary must defer to the other branches of government when
interpreting treaties such as the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol.24
depriving Mexico access to 49 detainees; (4) the United States breached its obligations under the
Vienna Convention by depriving Mexico of the opportunity to arrange for legal representation of
34 Mexican nationals; (5) the United States breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention
by refusing review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of three Mexican nationals;
(6) the United States must provide review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of
the detained Mexican nationals; (7) the United States must assure Mexico of non-repetition; and (8)
the United States shall provide for review and reconsideration in the event that Mexican nationals
be sentenced to severe penalties. Id
15. Torms III, No. PCD-04-442, at I (Chapel, J., concurring).
16. Id
17. Arena, No. 128, at 153(9).
18. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 1 (Chapel, J., concurring).
19. Id at 3; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that all treaties are the supreme law of the
land and bind state courts).
20. 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
21. Tores III, No. PCD-04-442, at 3-4 (Chapel, J., concurring); see Nielsen v. Johnson, 279
U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (stating in relevant part that "the treaty-making power is independent of and
superior to the legislative power of the states").
22. Torres Iff, No. PCD-04-442, at 4 (Chapel,J., concurring).
23. Id
24. Id at 5-6; see U.S. CONsT. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall have Power,
20041
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The Optional Protocol granted the I.C.J. judicial jurisdiction and power to
resolve disputes arising under the Vienna Convention, and accordingly, the State
Department has looked to the I.C.J. to "enforce United States rights under the
Convention. '25 In Avena, Mexico similarly sought the protection of Torres's
rights guaranteed by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 6 Judge Chapel
asserted that because the United States government ratified the treaty in 1969 and
the State Department has subsequently relied upon the I.C.J. authority and
jurisdiction in international law, the courts of the United States are not free to
decide whether or not they are bound by the Vienna Convention or I.C.J.
decisions.
27
B. The Avena Decision
Given the two undisputed facts that Torres is a Mexican national and that
the United States failed to inform him of his rights under the Vienna Conven-
tion, the I.C.J. concluded that the United States should "review and reconsider
Torres's conviction and sentence in light of the consequences of the treaty
violation."' Although Torres failed to raise his claim of the Vienna Convention
violation at the trial level, the Avena court reasoned that a procedural bar of the
petitioner's claim would fail to comply with the I.C.J.'s direction to review and
reconsider Torres's conviction and sentence.' Consequently, compliance with
the Vienna Convention mandated that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
re-examine the merits of Torres's claims.'
In Breard v. Greene,31 the United States Supreme Court indicated that a
Vienna Convention violation must have affected the outcome of the trial before
federal habeas relief would be warranted. 32 To meet this requirement of preju-
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties").
25. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 5-6 (Chapel, J., concurring); see Vienna Convention, 21
U.S.T. at 100-01 (affirming foreign nationals' consular rights).
26. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 6-7 (ChapelJ., concurring).
27. Id. at 2-7.
28. Id. at 7 (citing Avena, No. 128, at 153(1 1)).
29. Toms III, No. PCD-04-442, at 7-8 (Chapel,J., concurring); see Avena, No. 128, at 134
(stating that the application of the procedural default rule would bar Torres "from raising the issue
of the violation of his rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention"); see aLro Case Concerning
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) No. 104, IN 88-91 (I.C.J. June 27, 2001) (holding that the United States
could not procedurally default claims of Vienna Convention violations that had not been raised at
trial level).
30. Tores III, No. PCD-04-442, at 8 (Chapel, J., concurring).
31. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
32. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 9 (Chapel, J., concurring); see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371, 377 (1998) (per curiam) (stating that "it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result
in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had
an effect on the trial").
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diceJudge Chapel endorsed a three-prong test that state and federal courts have
devised.33 He described the three prongs to be as follows: "(1) the defendant did
not know he had a right to contact his consulate for assistance; (2) he would have
availed himself of the right had he known of it; and (3) it was likely that the
consulate would have assisted the defendant."'  The facts of the case satisfied
the first part of the test.3" On the second prong,Judge Chapel noted an affidavit
submitted by Torres in which he explained that he would have availed himself of
the services of the Mexican consulate had he been aware of this right.36 The
judge also found that this contention was more plausible because Torres's family
did contact the Mexican consulate in 1997 when he was finally informed of his
right.
37
Relying on the evidence of Mexico's "active assistance [that] extends back
to the 1920's," Judge Chapel discussed the third prong in more detail.38 This
"active assistance" supported Torres's contention that the Mexican consulate
would have been willing and able to assist the defendant, a Mexican national
facing capital charges within the United States.39 Furthermore, once Mexico was
informed of the charges against Torres, the consular staff conducted interviews
33. Tomes III, No. PCD-04-442, at 9 (Chapel, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Villa-
Fabela, 882 F.2d 434,440 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529,
533 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that "[tlo establish prejudice, the defendant must produce evidence that
1) he did not know of his right; 2) he would have availed himself of the right had he known of it;
and 3) 'there was a likelihood that the contact would have resulted in assistance to him in resisting
deportation' "); People v. Preciado-Plores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (employing a
similar three-prong test); Zavala v. State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (employing a
similar three-prong test).
34. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 9 (Chapel, J., concurring).
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id at 9-10.
38. Id at 10. Judge Chapel noted that:
In 1993, the Mexican government monitored and participated in capital cases
throughout the United States involving Mexican nationals through consulate, Mexican
government departments, and retained counsel in the United States. Mexico has a
systematic procedure to offer very specific consular assistance in defending these cases.
Consular officials monitor defense counsel's efforts, speak regularly with defense
counsel, the defendant and his family, and attend court proceedings; officials often
assist in gathering evidence in preparation for both stages of capital trials. Mexico
provides funds or experts and investigators,particularly regarding discovery and
presentation of mitigating evidence, but or DN testing, jury consultations, and other
specialized testimony where appropriate. Mexico obtains and provides official docu-
ments from institutions in Mexico such as schools and hospitals, searches for criminal
records, and assists attorneys traveling in Mexico 
with logistical support, translators,
and witness identification and preparation. In addition to aiding retained or appointedcounsel, the co sulate also helps capital defendants 
obtain qualified capital counsel.
Id at 10-11.
39. Id at 1.
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and the government retained multiple professionals to assist the defense and
develop evidence.'
Upon evaluating the evidence in light of the I.C.J.'s decision and the three-
prong prejudice test, Judge Chapel "concluded that there [was] a possibility a
significant miscarriage of justice occurred."'" Because Avena had directed the
United States to review and to reconsider Torres's conviction and sentence,
Judge Chapel concurred with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary
rehearing.4 2 In May of 2004 the Governor of Oklahoma commuted Osbaldo
Torres's sentence to life imprisonment, ending the necessity of further examina-
tion by the Oklahoma courts.4 3
IV. Application in Virginia
Judge Chapel's concurrence demonstrates the importance of familiarity with
international law in relation to capital defense. He illustrated the government's
obligations to inform detained foreign nationals of their Vienna Convention
rights and to communicate with their respective consulates.' Although Judge
Chapel's interpretation of Avena suggests that Article 36 violations cannot be
completely barred by United States judicial procedure, other courts have applied
procedural default doctrine to such treaty-based claims. 4 Attorneys representing
foreign nationals in capital cases should continue to assert such claims pretrial to
avoid any potential risk of default.
Torres III is noteworthy for its recognition that an I.C.J. decision in a capital
case has a binding effect upon state and federal courts within the United States."
Although the United States judiciary does not relinquish jurisdiction in cases
involving foreign nationals, the Optional Protocol designates the I.C.J. as the
appropriate forum to adjudicate Vienna Convention claims.47 Thereafter, by
40. Torres III, No. PCD-04-442, at 11-12 (Chapel,J., concurring). Mexico hired an attorney,
two investigators, a social worker, a mitigation specialist, two gang experts, and a bilingual
neuropsychologist. Id
41. Id at 12.
42. Id.
43. John Greiner, Henry Commutes Death Sentence, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 14,2004,
at 1A.
44. Torrs III, No. PCD-04-442, at 7-8 (Chapel, J., concurring).
45. See, e.g., Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (holding that petitioner's claim had been procedurally
defaulted for failure to raise the claim in state court); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97,100 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the petitioner's claim was "procedurally barred because he did not raise it
in state court and he cannot show cause and prejudice for his default"); Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703,
709 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (finding that the petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted
because "the legal basis for the claim [was] not new and was available at the time of Petitioner's first
Application for Post-conviction Relief).
46. Toms III, No. PCD-04-442, at 3-5 (Chapel,J., concurring).
47. Id at 5.
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virtue of the Supremacy Clause, such I.C.J. decisions also bind state courts.
48
Attorneys may anticipate I.C.J. instructions for review and reconsideration of
capital sentences of foreign nationals in cases involving Vienna Convention
violations. However, because the Oklahoma Governor commuted Torres's
sentence before the evidentiary rehearing, it remains to be seen how closely
United States courts will review and reconsider such cases.
Mark J. Goldsmith
48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that all treaties are the supreme law of the land and
bind state courts).
2004]
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